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Date: June 11, 1°5U 
Meeting was held starting Wednesday, June 9, 195U at 120 Broadway, New *ork. 
This meeting was called by the AMC Joint Progress Office headed by Colonel H. Osgood, 
Those present at the meeting are as indicated on the attached l i s t . 
Colonel Osgood opened the meeting by referring to a conference held on 
Saturday, June 5 at the Pentagon, Washington where representatives from the various 
commands of the Air Force, from the ADES organization and Doctor Hil l from Lincoln 
were present. Colonel Osgood stated that this meeting resulted in the conclusion by 
a l l present that the schedule for the AN/FSQ-7 Duplex Centrals should be altered so as 
to have a relatively low, early rate of production followed by a f ie ld evaluation t r ia l 
for the System and, subsequently, to have production at a higher rate than previously 
contemplated so as to provide the to ta l quantity of equipments for the country at 
approximately the same termination date as the present schedule would provide. 
I t was indicated that i f the presently contemplated schedule i s followed, 
by the time that the f i r s t two or three Direction Centers were instal led, co:mnitments 
would have been made by the Air Force for 25 such Direction Centers. ^Yd.8 sum of 
money was estimated to be $550,000,000 of commitments» I t was further stated that of 
this sum, approximately v>350,000,000 would probabjy^liave been actually spent for 
material, labor, servifees*_fitc«^_and only-alr'^nis time would f ie ld operation experience 
start to be gained on the i n i t i a l systems. The ADES people indicated that they did not 
believe the XD-1 System would provide operational experience under condition-3 which Tvjere 
close enough to field-operating conditions to provide any significant data regarding 
the performance of the overall system. They acknowledged that performance of the 
electronics of the computer, and other pieces within the F^Q-7, could be studied on *D-1 
and that some benefits would be gained in this particular area. 
The System, as i t i s referred to here, i s called the Semi-automatia Direction 
Center System, and i t includes not only the FSQ-7 hardware located within tho Direction 
Center building but the Data Processing system, including equipment at the radars, the 
transmission lines between the radars and the centrals, and also the Data Processing 
equipment and transmission l ines for Outputs from the Direction Central to the point3 
which connect to ground/air links for weapons. The ADES people continually 
indicated their concern was/ System as a whole, as mentioned abeve, and with 
the question of the abi l i ty of typical A lr Force type personnel,Jto do the jobs required 
in a l l phases of this entire System so as to provide an Air .Defense capability of the 
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type which the country needs at the earl iest practical moment* 
Colonel Osgood continued by outlining the purpose of the conference as 
being to establish a new overall schedule for design, manufacture and installation 
of equipment and associated buildings for Direction Canters based on sound principles 
and experience so as to provide a workable Defense capability for the Air Defense 
Command. He continued ~- that after a plan i s evolved through the discussions of the 
persons present at the meeting and subsequent considerations, the ^ would coordinate 
i t through the various Air Force Consnands to obtain agreensnt. After this — the new 
plan, whatever i t might be, would become the binding program for everyone involved in 
the *roJect to work t o . 
To provide an agenda for the discussion of the meeting, the following questions 
were developed: 
lo Field Trials for Performance ^valuation Test under Field Conditions; 
a. tthat are the objectives of the f ie ld t r i a l 7 
b. ft'ho wi l l outline the t e s t plan7 
c Who wil l make recommendations upon completion of test? 
2 e Field Trial Fac i l i t i es ; 
a. What i s the minimum amount of equipment requirement for an adequate 
f ie ld tr ia l? 
bo What can be gained from *D 1 and XD 2 operation? 
c What i s the earliest date that equipment for f ie ld t r ia l can be made 
available? Particularly, Combat Center? 
d. Where should t r ia l be conducted? 
3. Interim Production Effort; 
a. What is the minimum production rate to retain a potential for large scale 
production by all suppliers? 
b. Aye there any other limiting factors which effect the determination of 
interim rate? 
U» Large Scale Production: 
a. What level of large scale production can be achieved recognizing ability 
of ADC to absorb equipment from a manpower standpoint, to finance 
procurement •- i.e., dollars per fiscal year, etc? 
g. Revised Schedule 
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Discussion of the above questions resulted in the following answers: 
Item 1 
a,. The objectives of a performance evaluation test 
under field conditions is to ascertain that the system 
(including the combination of people working with 
equipment; will do the Defense job adequately, both 
from a military operations aspect and from an equipment 
performance and reliability aspect* 
b. The responsibility to draw up a proper test plan and 
coordinate all aspects of this test will lay primarily 
with ADES,with ADES using such assistance as may be 
required from other organizations, such as Idncoln and 
c» The answer to "b
n above, placing responsibility on 
XDES for the entire plan, includes recommendations 
resulting from the test itself. 
Item 2 
a. The conferees generally agreed that the minimum amount 
of equipment to accomplish the desired field trial or 
performance evaluation test would be two Direction Center 
systems and one Combat Center system, properly tied in 
together so that the operational work in each of these 
systems as well as the interrelation, crosstelling and 
command functions between them could be performed under 
what would be typical field conditions. 
b. This question was not directly answered, but other 
discussions throughout the conference indicated that ADES 
feels that XD 1 will indicate performance of the electronics, 
but will not provide for proper or adequate evaluation of 
the system capability, particularly from ̂military operations 
and the combination of personnel with equipments 
Cc Air Force people and ADES indicated they would like to 
have the two Direction Centers and the COC as soon as 
possible o In any event, they would like to have IBM provide 
whatever equipment is needed for a Combat Center on the 
basis of the present schedule for the No. 3 Direction center, 
that is, to have it available no later than two months after 
the No. 2 Duplex Central is available. 
d. location for this field trial was not answeredo 
Colonel Halley stated that it very likely would be advisable 
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not to place these Direction Centers in any strategic 
area, such as the New York — Boston vicinity, since 
conducting the evaluation tes t would present a drain 
to the Air Defense Command capacity to do real defense 
work and that adding this into a cr i t i ca l area would 
affect the defense capability and might require 
duplication of a considerable amount of f a c i l i t i e s : 
whereas, i f the systems to be tested were located in a 
less strategic area, a calculated risk could be taken 
and certain personnel, equipment and other f a c i l i t i e s 
diverted for use of the t e s t at the expense of reducing 
the current Air Defense capability in that particular 
area for the tes t period• 
item 3 
•̂tem U 
a. *he earliest date that the ADES people f e l t that 
production could be resumed and reflect any significant 
experience from the f i e ld evaluation test was f e l t to be 
December of 1957 or a period s ix months after the start 
of this test* (Note: ^ater in the discussion the following 
day, this date was modified to be October of 1957 so as 
to be more compatible with Fiscal Year Funding considera~ 
t ions . ) 
b. Another factor which might affect the subsequent 
production date following the f ie ld t r ia l i s the budget 
cycle required for public works monies for buildings3 
This matter was discussed at some length, but no conclu-
sions reached. 
£ . Tne answer to the minimum production effort during a 
waiting period between completion of the two Direction 
Centers and one Combat Center and the resumption of 
production after f ie ld t e s t experience was l e f t unanswered. 
This question was to be given to IBM with the request that 
they make a proposal. 
a. i^ventual production rate following f ie ld test experience 
was also l e f t for IBM to present as proposals. The 
Air Force pointed out, however, that they did not f ee l 
tJ- / could possibly absorb systems at a rate any greater 
thtuk "hree per month, because the question of manning and 
prov, ..on of funds for even this rate areVery serious 
problems. I t was stated that something between one and 
two syst*!r ; per month represented a more practical level 
at which the Air Force could handle t̂fSy equipment.. 
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Item $ 
The Revised Schedule was unanswered at this time with the 
thought that i t might be worked out the following day, but 
most l ikely would have to depend on the results of the 
study of the oroblem made by IBM, and proposals which 
they would offer following their considerations. 
Discussion regarding whether or not the proposed new schedule would 
represent a delay in tjroviding equipment for the A ir Defense Command resulted in a 
statement by Mr. Bagnall of Astern ^leetric that they f e l t that this would not 
represent any delay, but would, in fact, provide better equipment as soon, and 
perhaps sooner, than the present program, since the Bell System experience indicates 
that equipment of this type i f i t i s placed into production and installed without 
adequate system f ie ld experience results in a very extensive f ie ld modification 
period to elimir.ate a l l of the "bugs" and problems which arise as the equipment 
starts to be used by the eventual customer — in this case the Air Force. 
Mr. ^agnail said that they f e l t this period for modification would be approximately 
equal to the time period which the revised schedule would introduce into the program. 
No charts were available to show the specific periods involved, but later in the confer-
ence Mr. Bagnall further indicated that, in his opinion, this modification period 
would be something in the order of a couple of years for the early systems and 
might taper down to approximately one year for the systems installed at the tadl end 
of the program. Refer to Chart I 0 
The conference next turnsd to some discussion of the question of whether a 
complete pause in production following the i n i t i a l three systems, or a slow rate of 
production following the i n i t i a l three seemed to be desirable. The possibi l i ty of 
constructing four or five systems during this interval and placing the finished tested 
electronics into storage was discussedo Another alternative of building these systems 
and placing them into Direction Center buildings, but in portions of the country not 
regarded as cr i t i ca l sectors, was also discussed. I t was f e l t that this latter 
consideration might provide these centers as available f a c i l i t i e s for training of 
manpower to be placed at Direction Centers which would be installed at a later date© 
S t i l l another alternative expressed was the poss ibi l i ty of building only part of the 
FSQ-7 System, i . e . , these items which i t was mutually f e l t would be least l ikely to 
have design changes introduced into them as a result of the f i e ld evaluation test? 
The objective of maintaining some level of production, instead of a complete stopuage, 
was to provide a nucleus of manpower and equipment at the factory in operating condi-
tion to serve as the basis for a rapid acceleration to a much higher level of 
production at a subsequent time. 
On Thursday morning, June 10 representatives from IBM Company — namely, 
Messrs. Zollinger, Eraser and Vfaelan, joined the conference. Mr. Winer, who was 
serving as chairman of the meeting in the absence of Colonel Osgood, reviewed the 
previous day's discussion for the benefit of the IBM people, and posed the following 
v ^ •'-' 
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three questions for IBM to study and prepare reply and proposals for the JPO: 
1. What i s the very best delivery that IBM can provide for No. 1 and 2 
duplex FSQ~7°s and for a Combat Center set of equipment in place of No, 3 
FSQ-7 Duplex, as i t i s now programmed? Can the schedule shown on the present 
program be improved in any manner? 
2. Assuming a complete stoppage of production following the f i r s t two 
Direction Centers and one Combat Center, and authorization to in i t i a t e 
production with suitable contractual coverage in October 1957* what i s 
the best schedule rate that IBM could achieve thereafter? This rate 
was not to be limited to two systems per month i f IBM could possibly 
produce at any higher level , although i t was f e l t that two per month 
appears to be a practical limitation regarding the abi l i ty of the 
Air Force to absorb and man equipments. 
3_» Assume that a modest low level production rate would be continued 
after the f i r s t two Direction Centers and one Combat Center, and 
authorization with suitable contractual coverage for ful l -scale 
production again issued in October 1957, what level of oroduction in 
the interim would IBM fee l i s necessary to maintain a nucleus of 
production capability in their plant and in their vendors0 and 
subcontractors" during the interim period, and what i s the best 
pos8ibleDtfawc5tiS8equent to the authorization for ful l -scale produc-
tion in October of 1957? 
Mr. Wimer also stated that i f in the study of thesfe three points, IBM 
f e l t that there were any other alternatives which seemed to f i t the intent of the 
conference, the JPO would be happy to have additional proposals, i f IBM cared to 
offer them. 
Mr Wjjoer asked that the replies from IBM be made available as early as 
possible, and suggested June 25 as a completion date for their study* Mr* Zollinger 
indicated that they would make every effort to complete the work by this time, but 
that a few days longer may be required* 
MTO Zollinger stated that he was very surprised to encounter a proposal 
of the type presently being discussed. His past contact with the program for a 
period of two years had led him to f ee l that everyone in the Air Force was 
anxious to have an improved Air Defense system as early as possible and that they 
had mutually agreed that the Lincoln Transition System was a big step forward in 
achieving this desired increase in capability. He further stated that the current 
discussion leads him to fee l that somewhere the fundamental concept of the Lincoln 
Transition System i s now f e l t to be wrong and that the abi l i ty to improve air defense 
on a piecemeal basis by adding equipment as rapidly as i t can be made available i s 
now f e l t to be an unsatisfactory or undesirable approach to the problem. Hr5 Zollinger 
also stated that the apparent concern regarding system operation could, in his opinion, 
be bes^resolved by having those persons who are doubtful aboujHfte operation of any 
portion of the system, either equipment performance or operational aspects, place the 
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points of ooncem out on the table for fAafal "and open consideration by a l l parties 
involved In the program* Zollinger f e l t th is would be the most successful way to 
overcome any dif f icult ies which ex i s t , and provide Air Defense at the earl iest 
possible tine* He continued further by stating that i t also appeared that the 
previous feelings regarding the value of a single AN/FSQ-7 Duplex Central as a 
primary building block for Air Defense — and the benefits that could be gained by 
installing each of these units and bringing them into the System at an early date —• 
i s now minimized, or discounted completely* He referred to previous discussions 
where a single FSQ-7 Central serving a subsector, including four or five long range 
radars and associated gap f i l l e r s , was f e l t to be a forward step and an improvement 
in Air Defense (at th i s point Mr* Bagnall indicated that i t was thought that the 
installation of a single FSQ-7 of this type might in real i ty be a handicap)* 
Mr* Zollinger indicated that further consideration or review of th i s previous attitude 
certainly seemed warranted to determine whether this was not of some real value to the 
Air Defense Command* Mr. Zollinger concluded by indicating that IBM would study 
seriously the three questions given to them by the JPO, and would provide reply as 
expeditiously as possible. He said that their immediate off-hand reaction was that 
significant number of serious problems had arised in either of the alternatives 
mentioned in Items 2 or 3: question of company policy regarding personnel, investment 
in plant and equipment, relations with vendors and subcontractors, maintenance of moralej 
and the manufacturing and engineering organizations' increased costs were some of the 
points that immediately come to mind, but that the entire matter would be reviewed 
thoroughly, and a l l aspects of i t presented for consideration by the JPO* 
Mr* Whalen of IBM asked i f anyone could provide an opinion as to whether or 
not the equipment which would be placed into production, following some systems 
evaluation t e s t s , would contain many changes from the f i r s t three systems. I t was 
stated by various persons that there undoubtedly would be a number of changes. I t was 
impractical to determine the extent of them or the significance of these changes*, 
The simple fact that a relatively long time period would have elapsed might bring 
forth some newdevelopment in the art, which should be introduced into the subsequent 
production even i f the f ield evaluation <3id not bring forth significant changes* 
Mr* Schwartz in a sense replied to some of Mr* Zollinger's comments by 
indicating that the concern regarding system performance had more to do with other 
portions of the System than i t did with the AN/FSQ-7 hardware, i t s e l f . But ADES 
f e l t that one of the big questions t o be determined by a f ield evaluation t e s t i s 
the capability of man and eouipment to function in a manner which provides adequate 
Air Defense capability. Also, that they fee l the XD-1 i s primarily a laboratory tool 
and should be l e f t available for use by the laboratory development group to reflect 
charges and new ideas into i t and to be under the control of the engineering groups* 
To achieve th i s advantage, the System cannot be made available for operation and 
evaluation under an operating atmosphere which wil l be encountered by systems later on 
under Air Force tact ical use . 
I t appeared to the writer that the contractual discussi ADES 
and the Air Force have brought strongly to the ALES mind their responsibility as an 
organization for the success of the overall System as an operational tool for 
Air Defense. In view of th i s , they seem unwilling to extrapolate from Cape Cod Systwn 
and XD-1 System performance. Also, they seem to b$ looking towards something approxi-
mating 100 per cent of the eventual capability of the equipment, rather than looking 
toward increasing the present Air Defense capability in a succession of steps. A review 
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the increased capability over present-day Air Defense, which wi l l be possible when 
FSQ-/ direction ^enters are available, even i f other portions of the System ~ 
such as ground-to-air data l inks, et<c, are not available, should be made for 
Air Force and ADES consideration« 
MTO wimer, Major Gordon and Major Mertley, Mr<> Rader, and some ADES person-
nel remained to convene on Friday, June 11 to prepare a written report of the 
discussions of the two preceding days' conferences, which wi l l be issued to a l l 
organizations concerned^ 
APKtmeo A . f » ^romer 
attach0te 
cc! No H„ Taylor 
G. E. Valley 
%ctated but not read 
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